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Regan v. Wald, THE SUPREME COURT DEFERS TO
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY IN MATTERS OF
FOREIGN POLICY BY UPHOLDING TRAVEL
RESTRICTIONS TO CUBA
Under the American constitutional system, both the executive
and legislative branches effectuate foreign policy choices. The rela-
tionship between these two branches in international matters has
traditionally been one of transition, reflecting alternating periods
of congressional acquiescence and activity. In the area of foreign
policy, where courts have long attempted to strike a balance of au-
thority between the various branches of government, the decision
of the Supreme Court in Regan v. Wald1 stands as an important
indication that the Court will continue to allocate broad discretion
to the President in the exercise of emergency power.
In reaching its decision in Regan v. Wald, the Supreme Court
focused on the congressional intent behind two acts: the Amend-
ments to the Trading With the Enemy Act 2 (TWEA), and the In-
ternational Emergency Economic Powers Acts (IEEPA). In the re-
sulting decision the Court mistakenly characterized the two acts as
broad grants of Presidential discretion in matters of foreign pol-
icy," rather than the limiting statutes their drafters intended. The
Court further reaffirmed prior decisions upholding restrictions on
the freedom of Americans to travel internationally.5
This Note examines the decision of the Court in Regan v. Wald
as reflective of the traditional deference allowed the executive
branch in matters of foreign policy by the other two branches. The
effects of such deference on the freedom of American citizens to
travel abroad as declared in Regan v. Wald is also considered. The
Note focuses specifically on how the Supreme Court applied the
TWEA and IEEPA in Wald to the respective powers of the Presi-
I No. 82-1690-T (D. Mass. July 22, 1982), vacated, 708 F.2d 794 (1st Cir. 1983), rev'd, 104
S.Ct. 3026 (1984). The controversy central to the case involved whether regulations promul-
gated by the Reagan administration restricting general tourist travel to Cuba were improp-
erly formulated and therefore invalid. Id. at 3029-30.
' Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, ch. 106, 40 Stat. 411 (1917) (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982)).
- 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982).
' Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3034.
5 See infra notes 59-78 and accompanying text.
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dent and Congress in matters of foreign policy and the constitu-
tional right to travel. In conclusion, this Note briefly suggests an
amendment to the TWEA and IEEPA that would effectuate the
original intent of Congress behind the acts while retaining tradi-
tional Presidential flexibility in foreign policy areas.
I. THE AMENDMENTS TO THE TWEA AND IEEPA
The statutory basis of the issue presented by the Wald case
originated in section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act
passed in 1917.' Enacted six months after the United States en-
tered World War I, the legislation provided the President broad
economic powers in times of declared war,7 including the authority
to impose comprehensive embargoes on foreign countries.' The
purpose of the legislation was to grant the executive branch powers
necessary to react quickly to various situations as the exigencies
' 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982). In its relevant portions, § 5(b) stated:
(b)(1) During the time of war, the President may, through any agency that he
may designate, and under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, by
means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise
(A) investigate, regulate, or prohibit, any transactions in foreign exchange,
transfers of credit or payments between, by, through, or to any banking institu-
tion, and the importing, exporting, hoarding, melting, or earmarking of gold or
silver coin or bullion, currency or securities, and
(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent, or prohibit,
any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation,
importation, or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any rights, power, or
privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any for-
eign country or a national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect
to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b)(1) (1982).
Amending the Trading With the Enemy Act: Hearings on H.R. 7738 Before the Sub-
comm. on International Finance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1977) (colloquy between Senator Stevenson and Assistant
Treasury Secretary Fred Bergsten) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on H.R. 7738]. The provi-
sions of the bill were to operate in times of declared war beginning at "midnight ending the
day on which Congress has declared or shall declare war or the existence of a state of war."
50 U.S.C. app. § 2 (1982), 40 Stat. 412 (1917). From the inclusion of the phrase recognizing
the "existence of a state of war" onc can argue forcefully that Congress specifically acknowl-
edged the possibility of an "undeclared" war as a period when the TWEA would operate.
Further, one can argue that by limiting the definition of war to only those situations in
which Congress has declared war or when a state of war exists, Congress intentionally ex-
cluded the use of enhanced Presidential power in national emergencies which did not in-
volve military hostilities, as well as national emergencies arising from domestic sources.
8 The TWEA authorized a President to restrict, regulate, or prohibit altogether "any
transactions in foreign exchange, export or earmarkings of gold or silver coin or bullion or
currency, transfers of credit in any form . . . and transfers of evidences of indebtedness or
of the ownership of property between the United States and any foreign country." 50 U.S.C.
§ 5(b) (1976).
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surrounding any emergency required.' At the end of World War I,
Congress eliminated most of the wartime grants of enhanced Presi-
dential power. The TWEA remained in existence, however, to al-
low continued control over foreign assets retained by the Alien
Property Custodian established under the Act. 10
A major expansion of Presidential powers under the TWEA oc-
curred in 1933, when President Franklin Roosevelt invoked the Act
as authority for his proclamation of a national holiday closing all
American banks." Congress three days later extended the TWEA 2
to allow the President to invoke the broad spectrum of powers au-
thorized under the Act for use in peacetime as well as wartime
emergencies.' 3 In the years following President Roosevelt's procla-
mation and the concomitant Emergency Banking Relief Act, the
TWEA served as a basis for Executive action in other emergency
situations as well." In fact, under the authority of the TWEA
Presidents promulgated a total of 470 orders under the pretense of
ongoing national emergencies.1"
In the 1970's, Congress reasserted itself in areas of foreign policy
where the Legislature had earlier relinquished power to the Presi-
dent,16 in response to what many perceived as an overaccumulation
of powers by the executive branch under the authority of the
See H.R. REP. No. 85, 65th Cong., 1st Sess. (1917).
10 Note, Presidential Emergency Powers Related to International Transactions: Con-
gressional Recognition of Customary Authority, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 515, 518 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Presidential Emergency Powers].
" Proclamation No. 2039, 31 C.F.R. 522 (1939), reprinted in 12 U.S.C. § 95, repealed by
Exec. Order No. 11,825, 40 Fed. Reg. 1003 (1974).
1" Emergency Banking Relief Act of March 9, 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-1, 48 Stat. 1 (1933).
" Emergency Controls on International Economic Transactions: Hearings on H.R. 1560
and H.R. 2382 Before the Subcomm. on International Economic Policy and Trade of the
House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382]. At least one commentator suggests that
Congress authorized President Roosevelt's action as an acknowledgement that the Presiden-
tial proclamation was not in compliance with the law but was necessary during a time of
bona fide emergency. See Controls Adopted: Presidential Powers, 35 CONG. Q. 1574 (1977).
" In 1977, when the House of Representatives undertook to revise the TWEA, four decla-
rations of national emergency had been made authorizing Presidents to exercise broad pow-
ers: 1) President Roosevelt's declaration of a banking holiday, supra note 11; 2) President
Truman's declaration of an emergency with regard to Communist aggression in Korea, Proc-
lamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (1949-1953 comp.), reprinted in 64 Stat. A454 (1950); 3)
President Nixon's statement of emergency regarding a strike of postal workers, Proclama-
tion No. 3972, 3 C.F.R. 473 (1966-1970 comp.); and 4) President Nixon's emergency declara-
tion regarding import-export imbalances, Proclamation No. 4074, 3 C.F.R. 60 (1971-1975
comp.).
11 S. REP. No. 549, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 17-46 (1973).
10 Note, Presidential Emergency Powers, supra note 10, at 515.
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TWEA.17 To remedy this presumed imbalance, Congress enacted,
inter alia, the National Emergencies Act of 1976 (NEA). 5 The
NEA principally separated the President's peacetime emergency
powers from those which could be exercised in wartime emergen-
cies. 9 The bill further terminated "as of 2 years from the date of
enactment, powers and authorities possessed by the Executive as a
result of existing states of national emergency."20 The NEA ex-
empted powers, which the executive branch was authorized to ex-
ercise under section 5(b) of the TWEA,2" from the termination of
other national emergency powers.22 Over the years, presidents had
1 S. REP. No. 466, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
4540, 4541 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. 466].
'* 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1982). Section 101(a) of the NEA reads as follows:
(a) All powers and authorities possessed by the President . . . as a result of the
existence of any declaration of national emergency in effect on the date of enact-
ment of this Act are terminated two years from the date of such enactment. Such
termination shall not affect:
(1) any action taken or proceeding pending not finally concluded or determined
on such date;
(2) any action or proceeding based on any act committed prior to such date; or
(3) any rights or duties that matured or penalties that were incurred prior to
such date.
(b) For purposes of this section, the words "any national emergency in effect
means a general declaration of emergency made by the President."
50 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982).
"9 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976). As formulated, the National Emergencies Act actually accom-
plished more than a mere separation of the statutory authority of the President into powers
applicable during wartime emergencies, which remained part of the TWEA (codified at 50
U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1982)), and Presidential powers available in times of national emer-
gency other than war. Congress, by establishing the Act, sought to establish a framework of
procedures within which the President would have to operate in future national emergen-
cies. 50 U.S.C. § 1622(a), (d) (1982); see also S. REP. No. 1168, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2288 (report setting out the purpose of the
NEA) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1168]. These guidelines were carried virtually intact
the following year into the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. §§
1701-1706 (1982)) which served to supersede the NEA as the authority for Presidential ac-
tions during peacetime emergencies. 50 U.S.C. § 1601 (1982).
20 S. REP. No. 1168, supra note 19, at 2.
21 50 U.S.C. § 1651 (a)(1), repealed in Amendments to the Trading With the Enemy Act
of 1977, Pub. L. 95-223, § 101(d), 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 5(b)(1) (1982)).
2 The NEA provided that "all powers and authorities possessed by the President. .. as
a result of the existence of any declaration of national emergency in effect on the date of
enactment of this Act are terminated two years from the date of such enactment." 50 U.S.C.
§ 1601 (1982). The motivation behind the termination of all national emergency powers
existing at the time was to pare back the vast numbers of emergency powers, thereby bring-
ing order to the "disarray" present in the area of Presidential emergency powers. S. REP. No.
1168, supra note 19, at 9. "By providing for a termination of powers and authorities relating
to existing emergencies, the bill will make it possible for our Government to function in
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established numerous embargoes and freezing programs pursuant
to the power, granted by Congress under section 5(b) of the
TWEA, to regulate transactions between United States persons
and foreign governments or nationals.2" Rather than terminate
these exercises of power abruptly, Congress enacted a less contro-
versial measure by ordering its various committees and subcom-
mittees to study section 5(b) and to suggest revisions in the law.2
The congressional inquiry into Presidential emergency powers
resulted in the passage of amendments to the TWEA the following
year.2 6 Included in the same measure was the IEEPA,2 7 which sup-
plemented the procedural guidelines established by the NEA.28
This series of acts sought to completely separate war and peace-
time emergency powers,2 9 undermining what Franklin Roosevelt
accordance with regular and normal provisions of law rather than through special exceptions
and procedures which were intended to be in effect for limited periods during specific emer-
gency conditions." H.R. REP. No. 238, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1975).
23 See, e.g., Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500 (1959) (as amended, 27
Fed. Reg. 1116 (1962)) (prohibiting all foreign exchange transactions by persons within the
United States, the exporting or withdrawal from the United States of gold or silver coin or
bullion, currency or securities, et. seq.); Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 505
(1959) (prohibiting sales or purchases of strategic goods destined directly or indirectly for
specified communist countries except as licensed by the Treasury Department); and the
Foreign Funds Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 520 (1967) (maintaining blockages of for-
eign assets held in the United States).
24 S. REP. No. 1168, supra note 19, at 7.
2 The legislation provided:
Each committee of the House of Representatives and the Senate having jurisdic-
tion with respect to any provision of law referred to in subsection (a) of this sec-
tion shall make a complete study and investigation concerning that provision of
law and make a report, including any recommendations and proposed revisions
such committee may have, to its respective House of Congress within two hundred
and seventy days after [September 14, 1976], the date of enactment of this act.
50 U.S.C. § 1651(b) (1982).
28 Amendments to the Trading With the Enemy Act, Pub. L. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 5, 16, 1601, 1621, 1651 (1977)). The House of Representatives
passed the bill on November 30, 1977, with amendments. 123 CONG. REc. 38,165 (1977). The
House, at the strong insistence of the Senate, dropped from its version of the bill a provision
that subjected regulations issued by the President in response to a national emergency to a
congressional veto. Id. The Senate approved the reform measure on December 7, 1977. 123
CONG. REC. 38,691 (1977).
27 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982).
28 50 U.S.C. §8 1601, 1641 (1982).
29 Hearings on H.R. 7738, supra note 7, at 6 (colloquy between Senator Stevenson and
Assistant Treasury Secretary Fred Bergsten). The stated purpose of the Senate in passing
the two acts was to "revise and delimit the President's authority to regulate international
economic transactions during wars or national emergencies." Id. at 2. The wartime emer-
gency powers of the President would continue under the aegis of the TWEA, while powers
authorized during national emergencies short of war would be limited to the procedural
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accomplished in the Emergency Banking Relief Act.
To further effectuate the separation of wartime3" and other na-
tional emergency powers,31 Congress established separate proce-
dural guidelines for the different emergency situations. Important
to the issues in Regan v. Wald, however, Congress chose to con-
tinue without interruption, or to grandfather, Presidential powers
contained in section 5(b) of the TWEA.32 These provisions became
guidelines set forth in the NEA and IEEPA. Id.
30 The amendments to the TWEA left the powers of the President to act during wartime
virtually unchanged; however, the ability of the President to accumulate additional powers
was quite restricted. Congress achieved the desired separation of wartime powers and pow-
ers available during peacetime instances of national emergency by removing the language
Congress had added to the TWEA in the Emergency Banking Relief Act of 1933. Congress
attained this goal by simply striking the phrase "or during any other period of national
emergency declared by the President" from § 5(b)(1) of the TWEA.
Congress placed further restrictions on Presidential emergency powers during wartime by
striking from the TWEA a provision allowing the President to "take other and further mea-
sures not inconsistent [with the Act] for the enforcement of this subdivision." 50 U.S.C.
app. § 5 note (1982)(amendments to the TWEA). Congress dispensed with this provision
due to the vagueness of the language. Congress felt that the ability to "take other and fur-
ther acts" had provided an avenue for past Presidents to accumulate extensive power to the
exclusion of Congress. S. REP. No. 466, supra note 17, at 2. Except for these two changes,
Congress left the President's power under the TWEA as it had been and even increased the
maximum criminal fine for violation of the Act to $50,000 from $10,000. 50 U.S.C. app. § 16
(1982).
" Congress established the IEEPA as the repository for Presidential powers during na-
tional emergencies short of war. The IEEPA differed from the TWEA dramatically because
the IEEPA required that a President follow restrictive guidelines. First, the IEEPA ad-
dressed a weakness that had existed in the TWEA by defining specifically the term "na-
tional emergency." The IEEPA established that a national emergency triggering Presiden-
tial authority included "any unusual or extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole
or substanital part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect
to such a threat." 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1982). This definition limited the scope of one avenue of
potential abuse available under the TWEA by restricting a President's ability to unilaterally
define and declare national emergencies. See The National Emergency Dilemma: Balancing
the Executive's Crisis Powers with the Need for Accountability, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453,
1455 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, National Emergency Dilemma].
Second, in addition to those steps already required by the NEA, the IEEPA required a
President "in every possible instance, [to] consult with Congress before exercising any of the
authorities granted by [the IEEPA] and [to] consult regularly with Congress so long as such
authorities are exercised." 50 U.S.C. § 1703 (1982). This requirement was intended to re-
assert "Congressional supervision over the use of ... emergency powers." Note, National
Emergency Dilemma, supra at 1455.
The IEEPA further removed certain powers which had earlier been authorized under the
TWEA from a President's arsenal of available sanctions in future emergencies. 50 U.S.C. §
1702(a) (1982). For example, the President would no longer be permitted to "vest property,
seize records, [nor] regulate purely domestic economic transactions." S. REP. No. 466, supra
note 17, at 5.
"s 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 note (1982). The reason espoused in Congress for the grandfathering
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law when President Carter signed the legislation on December 12,
1977. 33
II. TRADE RESTRICTIONS WITH CUBA
Restrictions on trade with Cuba, such as those considered by the
Court in Regan v. Wald, developed gradually after being originally
initiated by the Kennedy administration in 1962.3' The early mea-
of § 5(b) powers was that to examine the existing restrictions in a partisan setting would
create the potential for delay of the bill's needed reforms unnecessarily. Congress hoped
that bypassing a heated partisan debate over the wisdom and motivation behind specific
restrictions regarding economic sanctions employed currently would expedite passage of the
amended TWEA and IEEPA. H.R. REP. No. 459, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1977) [hereinaf-
ter cited as H.R. REP. No. 459] ("Certain current uses of the authorities affected by H.R.
7738 are controversial - particularly the total U.S. trade embargoes of Cuba and Vietnam
. . . [therefore] by 'grandfathering' existing uses of these powers, without endorsing or dis-
claiming them, H.R. 7738 adheres to the committee's decision to try to assure improved
future uses rather than remedy possible past abuses.") Id.; see also Hearings on H.R. 1560
and H.R. 2381, supra note 13, at 190-91 for a colloquy between Leonard E. Santos, attorney
advisor, Office of the General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, and Rep. Jonathan B.
Bingham:
Mr. Bingham: What is the state of fact with respect to Cuba?
Mr. Santos: That gets us into the merits. We would like to avoid that issue. I
think, frankly, in terms of getting this bill approved and passed at some stage, to
the extent it does not get into substance but limits itself to procedural issues that
are clearly intended by the National Emergencies Act, that it would have a much
better chance.
Mr. Bingham: I agree.
Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 207-08.
33 President's Statement on Signing H.R. 7738, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1940, 1941
(Dec. 28, 1977) [hereinafter cited as President's Statement] ("In approving the bill, I must
note my serious concern over the provision contained in section 207(b), which would allow
Congress to terminate a national emergency declared by the President by concurrent resolu-
tion.") Id. at 1941.
Interestingly, the two branches viewed the legislation quite differently. President Carter
described the bill as "largely procedural." Id. ("Its broad purpose is to differentiate between
those [powers] available in time of declared national emergency.") Id.; But cf. supra note
18.)
President Carter's interpretation of the bill differed further from that of the House when
he described the Act as'not affecting "embargoes now being exercised against certain coun-
tries [nor as affecting] . . . the blockade of assets of those or other countries." President's
Statement, supra, at 1941 (emphasis added).
" Proclamation No. 3447, 3 C.F.R. 26-27 (1962). The initial embargo resulted from the
urging of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as
Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.
The Administration cited "the subversive offensive of Sino-Soviet Communism with which
the Government of Cuba [was] publicly aligned" as the cause instigating "member states
• . . to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual and collec-
tive self-defense." Id.
As authority for the establishment of an embargo of all trade between the United States
and Cuba, President Kennedy used the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. (Foreign Assistance
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sures3 5 resulted from escalating tensions between Cuba and the
United States and barred virtually all transactions between sub-
jects of the United States and Cuba or Cuban nationals."6 These
restrictions, as a result, served to effectively ban general tourist
travel to Cuba.37
The embargo remained in place, unaffected by the vicissitudes of
United States-Cuba relations in the years following 1963. In 1977,
hoping to normalize relations between the two countries 3 the
Carter administration relaxed the restrictions by granting a general
license authorizing Americans to enter transactions incident to
general tourist travel.3 9 In 1982, however, in response to Cuban at-
tempts to destabilize governments friendly to the United States in
Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
22 U.S.C.)).
3' The Cuban Import Regulations (CIR), formulated by the Department of the Treasury,
implemented the embargo. 27 Fed. Reg. 1116 (1962) (codified as amended at 31 C.F.R. Part
515) (1984). The CIR prohibited "the importation into the United States of all goods of
Cuban origin and all goods imported from or through Cuba." 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1984).
The CIR did not contemplate, however, any prohibitions on travel to Cuba by Americans.
Rather, the Treasury promulgated the CIR to augment a ban on exports to Cuba estab-
lished as a response to the detention of American citizens and the seizure of American prop-
erty in Cuba as well as discriminatory practices toward the United States in Cuba's trade
policies. 43 DEP'T ST. BULL. 715, 715-16 (1960).
3' In the year following the CIR, the Kennedy administration applied more extensive
sanctions against Cuba as a part of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), 31
C.F.R. § 515 (1963). The CACR revoked the CIR in favor of more restrictive controls on
financial and commercial transactions. Id. at 6975 (1963). The CACR listed the Trading
With the Enemy Act as authority for the regulations, and empowered the President with a
broad spectrum of available sanctions corresponding to those available under the TWEA.
Compare 28 Fed. Reg. 6975 (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 515.201 (1983)) with 50 U.S.C. app. § 5
(1982).
" See 31 C.F.R. § 515.310 (1984) (defining "transfers" which were to be prohibited).
The general relaxation of restrictions came about gradually as both countries had made
overtures regarding the normalization of relations for many years. STATE OF THE CONGRES-
SIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1975) (impres-
sions of conversations on major issues with Cuban officials collected by Barry Sklar of the
Congressional Research Service) (hereinafter cited as Committee Print, Conversations]. For
example, in the early months of 1975 the leaders of both countries issued statements indi-
cating a willingness to foster more amicable relations. Id. at 2.
3' Attempts at normalizing relations received a boost in 1977 with the granting by the
Carter administration of a general license "authorizing persons who visit Cuba to pay for
their transportation and maintenance expenditures (meals, hotel bills, taxis, etc.) while in
Cuba." 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1977).
The general license was published in a modified final form on May 18, 1977, further re-
laxing existing restrictions on travel-related transactions between persons within the United
States and Cuba or Cuban nationals. 31 C.F.R. § 515.60 (1978). The general license, how-
ever, remained subject to regulation 805 of the CACR, which subjected the license to the
limitation that "the provisions of... any . . . licenses . . . may be amended, modified, or
revoked at any time." 31 C.F.R. § 515.805 (1984).
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the Western Hemisphere and throughout the world, the Reagan
administration tightened restrictions on travel-related transactions
involving subjects of the United States' by revoking the Carter
administration's general license. 1 This revocation effectively lim-
ited authorized travel to Cuba to certain specified exceptions.2
Shortly after the establishment of the 1982 restrictions, a group
of American citizens desiring to travel to Cuba sought a prelimi-
nary injunction against the enforcement of the new Treasury De-
partment Regulations in the Federal District Court for the District
of Massachusetts. 3 The district court refused to grant the tempo-
rary injunction sought by complainants. 44 On appeal, the First Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court's ruling and re-
manded the case with instructions to issue the injunction. 5
The court of appeals held that the travel restrictions which the
40 The Administration cited partially as its explanation for tightening the embargo that:
[S]ince 1978, Cuba, with Soviet political, economic, and military support, has
provided widespread support for armed violence and terrorism in this hemisphere.
Cuba also provides and maintains close to 40,000 troops in various countries in
Africa and the Middle East where these forces impede political solutions to re-
gional problems and further Soviet foreign policy interests. It is important to U.S.
national security to counter Cuban efforts to further Soviet strategic goals.
Declaration of Miles R.R. Frechette, Director, Office of Cuban Affairs, Department of State,
4, Regan v. Wald J.A., at 107 [hereinafter cited as Frechette Declaration].
Another reason behind the regulations was the "difficult" position of Cuba's hard cur-
rency reserves (Id. 17, at 107), which Cuba had sought to alleviate by actively soliciting
tourism from the United States and other Western powers. Id. 7-8, at 107-08. See also
Impact of Cuban-Soviet Ties in the Western Hemisphere: Hearings before the Subcomm.
on Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-99 (1978).
"' The revocation of the general license was not characterized as such, but instead as only
an amendment to the license. More to the point, however, the summary of the new regula-
tion stated "[t]ransactions relating to ordinary tourist or business travel will no longer be
permitted." 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1982).
42 Permissible transactions under the new CACR included only those transactions inci-
dent to travel by officials of the United States government, employees of news or film mak-
ing organizations in pursuit of information gathering purposes, or persons visiting close rela-
tives in Cuba. Id. The Cuban government has since decried the Reagan administration's
restrictions as an attempt to hide the truth about Cuba from the American people. N.Y.
Times, Sept. 13, 1984, §A, at 5, col. 4 (Daily Ed.). In as much as the tighter restrictions did
nothing to alter the freedom of news or film making organizations to visit Cuba, these asser-
tions appear at best to be disingenious.
, The complainants argued that the regulations were invalid in as much as they had not
been published pursuant to the guidelines established in the IEEPA. Wald v. Regan, 708
F.2d 794, 795 (1st Cir. 1983).
" Wald v. Regan, No. 82-1690-T (D. Mass. July 22, 1982). The district court held that
there had not been a convincing showing presented by Wald and the other complainants
that they would prevail on the mertis. Id.
• Wald, 708 F.2d at 795.
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Reagan administration sought to reinstate were not properly for-
mulated under either the provisions of the IEEPA e or under the
grandfather clause exception included in the NEA and subsequent
measures."' Since the court of appeals decided the question on
statutory grounds, the court deemed it unnecessary to determine
the sufficiency of Wald's constitutional claim that the travel re-
strictions violated his right of freedom to travel abroad. 8
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals,49 holding that Presidential powers authorized by the re-
formed TWEA, 0 coupled with the traditional deference conceded
the Executive by the other two branches of government in matters
of foreign policy, provided sufficient authorization for the enforce-
ment of the Reagan administration's modification of the Cuban
Assets Control Regulations (CACR). 1
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Wald in the wake of
conflicting decisions in the lower courts52 regarding issues arising
from the revocation of the Carter general license. The Court fur-
46 Id.
47 Id. at 796-97.
48 Id. at 794.
" Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3030.
11 Id. at 3035.
Id. at 3039.
52 See, e.g., United States v. Frade, 709 F.2d 1387 (11th Cir. 1983); Tagle v. Regan, 643
F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981).
In Frade, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to enforce the Reagan adminis-
tration's revocation of the Carter administration's general license, holding instead that the
revocation was invalid under the "grandfather" clause contained in the reformed TWEA.
Frade, 709 F.2d at 1397. ("While the ambiguous terms 'authorities' and 'exercised' may ap-
pear to be elastic enough to encompass the interpretation [that the revocation power was
grandfathered] we agree with the recent first circuit opinion in Wald v. Regan . . . that a
narrow, restrictive interpretation is compelled by the legislative history and purpose of the
grandfather clause and by its function within the broader statutory scheme.") Id. at 1397-
98. The court in Frade ruled that Congress, in grandfathering section 5(b) powers, intended
solely and entirely to protect those regulations existing at the time the IEEPA came into
effect from the legal disruption which would have been caused by termination of their statu-
tory authorization and the diplomatic disruption which might have resulted from declaring
a new state of emergency. Id. at 1399. The court, however, made no mention of the limita-
tion that any general license granted under the CACR remained subject to revocation at any
time. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Frade, however, can be criticized for going beyond the
explanation necessary to resolve the issue presented it. The court rejected the option of
deciding the case on the limited grounds of construction of the word "authorities," and
instead issued a sweeping invalidation of the new restrictions, writing that "[u]nlike Regula-
tion 515.415, the existing regulations were not intended to curb travel or control the flow of
immigration. The existing programs were entirely financial, and the grandfather clause was
intended to be limited to such financial transactions." Id. at 1400 (emphasis added).
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ther sought to delineate guidelines regulating the use of
grandfathered section 5(b) powers that Presidents would be re-
quired to follow when acting pursuant to a national emergency.53
Respondents argued that the government should be enjoined
from enforcing the provisions of the modification on both proce-
dural and constitutional grounds.5" First, respondents contended
that the modification was ineffective as a restriction in that it was
improperly promulgated under the IEEPA.55 Respondents further
argued that the modification violated the constitutionally pro-
tected rights of free travel and equal protection56 by restricting,
without due process of law, citizens' ability to travel freely outside
of the country. 7
The government, conversely, contended that the ability to re-
strict travel by way of modifying a general license was authorized
by the grandfather provision included in the NEA, IEEPA, and
TWEA.5 The government argued that even though the President
was not specifically employing his power to restrict tourist travel to
Cuba at the time powers were grandfathered, he was exercising all
authorities which had been granted to him under the TWEA. The
government concluded, therefore, that the power to restrict travel-
related transactions was extended through the termination period
for other emergency powers not falling within the authorization of
section 5(b).59 Second, the government argued that the foreign pol-
icy goal of limiting Cuban reserves of hard currency outweighed
any constitutional concerns regarding the right to free travel.6 0
In issuing its opinion, the Court in Wald, unlike the court of
appeals, addressed the issue of the constitutional right to free
travel.8 1 The Court concluded that "weighty concerns of foreign
53 Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3028.
" Id. at 3029-30.
53 The government conceded that the rules were not established according to the provi-
sions of the IEEPA. Id. at 3032. Consequently, this concession required the Administration
to bring the modification under authority of the grandfather provision of the NEA, IEEPA,
and TWEA. Id.
" Id. at 3038.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 3032.
59 Id.
" Id. at 3039; see also 31 C.F.R. § 515.560 (1983); Frechette Declaration, supra note 40, 1
9, at 108. See generally TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-15, 953-958 (1978); J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 802-806 (2d ed. 1983).
", The Court subjected itself to criticism by addressing the constitutional issue of a right
to travel regarding an issue that could have been decided without resort to constitutional
doctrine.
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policy" 62 protected the Reagan administration's restrictions on the
right of Americans to travel to Cuba from constitutional attack. 3
Whether a President may limit travel by American citizens to
foreign countries has been considered by the Supreme Court on
numerous occasions. 4 The outcome of such cases has often re-
flected concessions made to the Executive by the other two
branches in matters of foreign policy. 5 One of the leading cases
regarding the freedom to travel abroad was Kent v. Dulles,6" in
which the Court established the ability of American citizens to
journey outside of the country as a constitutionally protected right.
In Kent, the Supreme Court declared in dicta that American citi-
zens could not be deprived of their freedom to travel without due
process of law.17
The Court limited the broad protections of freedom to travel
abroad granted in Kent the following year in Zemel v. Rusk." In
Zemel, the Court distinguished" the rights of citizens to be free
from restrictions on travel because of political beliefs, 70 and the
ability of the government to restrict foreign travel due to policy
considerations. 7
1
"' Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3039 (citing United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967)).
63 Id. at 3038-39.
See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Apthecker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964); Zemmel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
" See, e.g., Zemmel, 381 U.S. at 7-9; Agee, 453 U.S. at 280-82 (revocation of passports
held authorized under the Passport Act of 1926 when the Secretary of State determined
that travel of an American citizen abroad was likely to cause national security hazards).
- 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
" Id. at 125. In dicta, the Supreme Court indicated that the right to travel was a liberty
"as close to the heart of the individual as the choice of what he eats, or wears, or reads." Id.
at 126. The Supreme Court in Kent never actually decided the issue of constitutionality
however. Id. at 129. Rather, the case turned on whether the Secretary of State had acted
within the scope of powers delegated him. Id.
Nonetheless, the Kent Court summarized its view on the freedom to travel abroad in
dicta by stating, "[wie need not decide the extent to which [the right] can be curtailed. We
are first concerned with the extent, if any, to which Congress has authorized its curtail-
ment." Id. at 127.
- 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1965).
" The Court made this distinction in upholding the ability of the government to elimi-
nate Cuba from the areas for which passports were not required. Id. at 12-13. The Zemel
Court recognized, as it had in Kent, that the ability to travel unrestricted by one's political
beliefs was a right of constitutional stature. Id. at 13.
70 Such a right found its basis in the dicta of the Kent decision. See supra note 67.
" Id. at 14-15 ("We think ... that the Secretary has justifiably concluded that travel to
Cuba by American citizens might involve the Nation in dangerous international incidents,
and that the Constitution does not require him to validate passports for such travel.") Id. at
15; See also J. COOPER, JunIciAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980).
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The Supreme Court again considered the protection of the right
to travel afforded by the Constitution in Haig v. Agee. 72 The Agee
Court reiterated the logic of the Zemel decision by reaffirming that
the liberty to travel internationally "is subject to reasonable gov-
ernmental regulation. 7 3
In Regan v. Wald, the Supreme Court continued the reasoning
presented in Agee by recognizing that American citizens are indeed
afforded a constitutional right to travel abroad.7 4 The Wald Court
also continued the foreign policy exception begun in Zemel1 5 and
furthered in Agee," in that it allowed restrictions on travel where
there is a substantial likelihood that United States national secur-
ity or vital interests are threatened,7 or where such limitations are
justified by the "weighty considerations of national security. '78
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority in Wald, further dis-
pensed with the court of appeals' rationale that the President had
no power under the TWEA79 to restrict travel as "ultimately un-
convincing."80 The majority cited the absence of applicable lan-
72 453 U.S. 280 (1981). The controversy presented by Agee arose when the State Depart-
ment revoked the passport of an ex-CIA agent who had declared an intention "to expose
CIA officers and agents and to take the measures necessary to drive them out of the coun-
tries where they are operating [and] to seek within the United States to have the CIA abol-
ished." Note, Clarifying the Authority Delegated to the Secretary of State for the Control
of Passports: Haig v. Agee, 24 B.C.L. REV. 435, 436, n.19 (1983) (quoting Appendix E to
petition for certiorari at 107(a)).
" Agee, 453 U.S. at 306. The Court held that where "there is a substantial likelihood of
,serious damage' to national security or foreign policy as a result of a passport holder's activ-
ities in foreign countries, the Government may take action to ensure that the holder may
not exploit the sponsorship of his travels by the United States." Id. at 309.
" Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3038.
" 381 U.S. at 15-16.
"6 453 U.S. at 309.
" Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3038. Accord Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1977); Califano v.
Aznavorian, 439 U.S. 170, 176 (1978).
78 Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3039; see also Zemmel, 381 U.S. at 15-16.
'o Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3033. The court of appeals wrote that "as a matter of common sense
and common English, restricting, say, commodity purchases and restricting travel purchases
would seem to be very different 'exercises' of authority - different enough at least not to
count as the exercise of the same authority." Wald, 708 F.2d at 796. The court of appeals
suggested that the authorites conferred on the President by § 5(b) of the Trading With the
Enemy Act and grandfathered by subsequent legislation were frozen in place on July 1,
1977, and as such could not be expanded beyond the actual prohibitions in effect on that
date.
W' ald, 104 S.Ct. at 3033. The Court held that:
"Neither the legislative history nor the apparent purposes of the 1977 Act
[which 'grandfathered' existing uses of power under the TWEA] sufficiently sup-
ports the contrary contention that what Congress actually intended, despite the
statutory language, was to freeze existing restrictions, so that any adjustment of
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guage in the amended TWEA as an indication that Congress in-
tended to remove from the President the ability to restrict
transactions incident to travel."1
The Court also rejected the court of appeals' argument that the
Reagan administration's ability to restrict travel had been lost
since direct controls over travel were not in place when existing
powers were grandfathered.8 2 The Court, instead, held that the
Reagan administration's travel restrictions were indeed continued
under the protection of regulation 201(b) 3 through the termina-
tion period included in the NEA, IEEPA, and the TWEA.8 4 The
majority reasoned that the President was exercising authority over
all transactions by choosing which to allow and which to prohibit,
and, therefore, such exercise protected the President's power over
travel-related transactions from termination. 5
pending embargoes would require the declaration of a new 'national emergency'
under the procedures of IEEPA."
Id.
"I Justice Rehnquist dismissed the argument that the TWEA removed the power to regu-
late travel-related transactions as "frivolous." Id. at 3034, n.16. "For purposes of TWEA, it
is clear that the authority to regulate travel-related transactions is merely part of the Presi-
dent's general authority to regulate property transactions." Id. at 3034 (footnote omitted).
The Court reiterated that the President's authority under the TWEA and CACR included
the ability to control any transaction involving any property that Cuba or a Cuban national
had an interest in directly or indirectly. Justice Rehnquist concluded, therefore, that trans-
actions incident to travel such as the payment of hotel bills, meals, and transportation fell
under the President's authority and could be regulated or even prohibited outright. Id. at
3034 n.16.
82 Id. at 3034. The relevant portion of the NEA (set out in full in note 18 supra) which
was continued by the TWEA and IEEPA allowed the continued exercise of "[a]ll powers
. . . in effect on the date of enactment of this Act" for a period of two years. 50 U.S.C. §
1601(a) (1982). The court of appeals held this provision meant that only those specific re-
strictions actually in place and in force on July 1, 1977, would be grandfathered. Wald, 708
F.2d at 796. The court of appeals surmised that by granting a general license, authorizing
American citizens to enter into transactions for food, lodging, and transportation, the Carter
administration forfeited the ability of a future President to impose travel restrictions. As
the court stated, "[tihe State Department, which had restricted travel to Cuba through
passport regulations under 22 U.S.C. § 211(a), eliminated these regulations during the same
month." Id. (emphasis added).
83 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1984).
Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3034.
88 Regulation 201(b) (31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (1983)) authorized the President to regulate
all transactions involving Cuban property interests. Id. The majority held that since Regula-
tion 201(b) was in operation before as well as after July 1, 1977, "absent an explicit license,
all transactions involving Cuban property are and, at all relevant times, have been prohib-
ited." Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3034. The basis of the majority's logic was that the largest subsec-
tion of powers grandfathered by the TWEA and IEEPA was an "authority" to act on a
particular subject. See Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3034-35. The "authority" relevant to the instant
case, according to the majority, was the power to "investigate, regulate, direct and compel,
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The Court, in addition, rejected the court of appeal's interpreta-
tion of congressional intent behind the grandfathering provision.8"
The majority wrote that the principal motivation behind the
grandfathering of existing embargoes was to expedite passage
through Congress of the new program of procedures Presidents
must follow in future crises under the IEEPA.8
7
Writing for the minority in Wald, Justice Blackmun s argued
that the Reagan administration's restrictions were not among ex-
isting uses of Presidential power grandfathered by section 101(b)
of the amended TWEA and IEEPA.ss While the majority found
congressional intent to maintain broad Presidential powers to in-
sure flexibility in foreign policy matters,9" the dissent found cor-
rectly a congressional intent to diminish Presidential discretion.9'
The dissenters argued that Congress grandfathered the authori-
ties existing on July 1, 1977, for two principal reasons.92 First, ac-
nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any ...transaction [relating to property] in which any
foreign country or a national thereof has any interest." 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1)(b) (1982). The
majority thus viewed the Carter administration's relaxation of regulations not as the elimi-
nation of any control over the subject nor as an abdication of power. Rather, the Court
viewed the Carter general license as merely an adjustment in the continuing exercise of
authority under § 5(b) of the TWEA.
Conversely, the majority saw as the smallest subsections of power, "current restrictions"
and "existing prohibitions." See Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3036 n.21. To the majority then, restric-
tions or prohibitions referred only to the exact programs for travel restrictions in place as of
July 1, 1977, the termination date for powers not grandfathered. Id. at 3035. The court
pointed out that this narrow grant of continuing power could have been insured quite easily
had Congress grandfathered only existing "prohibitions." Id. To the Court, the fact that
Congress chose not to limit grandfathered powers indicated "that Congress intended the
President to retain some flexibility to adjust existing embargoes." Id.
11 Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3037. The court of appeals wrote that existing restrictions were
grandfathered to avoid ending such restrictions without some sort of quid pro quo. Wald,
708 F.2d at 799.
" Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3037; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text. Both the Su-
preme Court and the court of appeals views have merit in that Congress did debate consid-
erably both reasons for the grandfather clause.
88 Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Powell joined Justice Blackmun's dissent. Wald, 104
S.Ct. at 3040. The basic position of the minority was quickly set out in its first paragraph.
Justice Blackmun contended that since all parties conceded that the Reagan administra-
tion's travel restrictions were not written according to the prescribed formula set out in the
IEEPA, nor included among the Presidential powers included in the grandfather clause of
the amended TWEA and the IEEPA, any attempt to enforce the 1982 regulations would be
error. Id. at 3040.
I d.
90 See infra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3043-44 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissenters found it clear
that Congress intended to restrict the authority that had been collected by Presidents dur-
ing past emergencies that no longer fit the congressional conception of that term. Id.
" The dissenters argued that a minor basis for their position was that the grandfathering
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cording to the minority, Congress grandfathered powers under the
amended TWEA to maintain the diplomatic status quo with coun-
tries affected by embargoes currently in place.93 Such grandfather-
ing was, therefore, intended to insure a flexible bargaining position
in future negotiations with embargoed countries. 4 Second, the dis-
senters cited congressional desire to avoid any adverse conse-
quences in negotiations that would result should a President be
forced by termination of an embargo to declare a new national
emergency with respect to a country affected by an embargo in or-
der to maintain sanctions against that country. 5
III. EFFECT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
As a practical matter, the Court's decision in Regan v. Wald will
have little effect on sanctions applied by the United States glob-
ally."6 The decision, conversely, will have a major impact on con-
of § 5(b) was intentionally narrow. Justice Blackmun pointed out that Congress deleted §
101(b)(2) in an attempt to constrict the powers subject to the grandfather clause. Id. at
3043.
The original provision provided that existing powers would be grandfathered along with
"any other authority conferred upon the President by . . . section [5(b)] (which or that)
may be exercised to deal with the same set of circumstances." Id.; see Subcommittee Work-
ing Draft of June 8, 1977, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b).
" Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3042-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Congress heard considerable testimony that it would be counterproductive to constrict
a President's access to a certain sanction without first securing some reciprocal concession
from a country affected by the exercise of § 5(b) powers. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 1560
and H.R. 2382, supra note 13, at 19 (statement of Prof. Lowenfeld):
The difficulty with this approach [repealing all § 5(b) powers] is that it would
bring down with it a number of programs, such as the embargo on trade with
Cuba, that perhaps should not be terminated, or should not be terminated just
now, or should not be terminated without a quid pro quo. I say only that it would
be a very awkward act (perhaps even an inappropriate interference in negotiations
being carried out by the Executive [sic] branch) if the embargo were suddenly to
end without any deal or understanding, just because the Executive [sic] branch in
prior administrations had from time to time overstepped its bounds.
Id. at 19; see also id. at 103, 113, 119 (statement of Assistant Treasury Secretary Bergsten);
123 CONG. REC. 22,477 (1977) (statement of Rep. Whalen).
" Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3043 (Blackmun, J. dissenting); see Hearings on H.R. 1560 and H.R.
2382, supra note 13, at 190, for a colloquy between Leonard E. Santos, Office of the General
Counsel, Department of the Treasury, and Rep. Bingham:
Mr. Bingham: "I can see the problem. I personally would not argue that we should ask or
expect the President to declare, for the first time an emergency with respect to Cuba." Id.
" The powers that were extended as a result of grandfathering § 5(b) involved few coun-
tries in terms of global significance. Included in the grandfathered powers were:
(1) the foreign assets control regulations, which block the assets of, and limit
transactions with the People's Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, and
Cambodia;
(2) the Cuban assets control regulations, which block the assets of, and limit
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gressional attempts at limiting Presidential power under the
IEEPA.9 7 The decision in Wald, however, will have its greatest im-
pact in the area of foreign policy powers, because it is the latest
installment in a long line of cases granting broad latitude to the
President in matters of foreign policy. 8
Courts have espoused various rationales in support of this tradi-
tional deference allowed the President.9 One justification cites the
unity of purpose present in the executive branch, where ultimate
authority for policy decisions rests in one person.1 °° Another notes
that unlike the legislative branch, the Executive is never in a pe-
riod of recess and can, therefore, continuously effectuate policy. 101
A final reason emphasizes the secrecy inherent in the office of the
President. 102 Taken together these reasons acknowledge that the
executive branch "is the best equipped of the three branches to act
with the necessary decisiveness, dispatch, and knowledge ' 03 re-
transactions with, Cuba;
(3) the transaction control regulations, which prohibit U.S. persons from partici-
pating in shipping strategic goods to any of the following countries: Albania, Bul-
garia, People's Republic of China, Cambodia, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic
Republic and East Berlin, Hungary, North Korea, Outer Mongolia, Poland and
Danzig, Romania, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam, and South Vietnam;
(4) the foreign funds controls regulations, which continue World War II block-
age of the assets of Czechoslovakia, Estonia, the German Democratic Republic,
Latvia, Lithuania, and their nationals.
S. REP. No. 466, suprd note 17, at 2.
The scope of the law has further been diminished since the passage of the IEEPA and the
amended TWEA by the cessation of all uses of § 5(b) authority with regard to China. Wald,
104 S.Ct. at 3048 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
11 See infra notes 124-31 and accompanying text.
'8 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1980). In Dames & Moore, the Court
described its decision as "only one more episode in the never-ending tension between the
President exercising the executive authority in a world that presents each day some new
challenge with which he must deal and the Constitution under which we all live and which
no one disputes embodies some sort of system of checks and balances." Id. at 662.
9 Note, The International Emergency Economic Powers Act: A Congressional Attempt
to Control Presidential Emergency Power, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1103 (1983) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Congressional Attempts to Control]. See also Zemel, 381 U.S. at 17:
[B]ecause of the changeable and explosive nature of contemporary international
relations, and the fact that the Executive is immediately privy to information
which cannot be swiftly presented to, evaluated by, and acted upon by the legisla-
ture, Congress-in giving the Executive authority over matters of foreign af-
fairs-must of necessity paint with a brush broader than that it customarily
wields in domestic areas."
Id. at 17.
100 Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 319-21.
101 Note, Congressional Attempts to Control, supra note 99, at 1103.
102 Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 320.
10' Note, Congressional Attempts to Control, supra note 99, at 1103.
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quired in foreign policy matters. As such, courts have allowed the
Executive broad latitude in the international arena. In fact, the
Court in Haig v. Agee'0" wrote that "[m]atters intimately related
to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper subjects
[even] for judicial intervention. '10 5 Perhaps the Court issued its
most definitive statement in modern times on the subject of Presi-
dential supremacy in the realm of foreign policy in United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.106 In Curtiss-Wright, the Court at-
tributed to the Executive broad powers of discretion and freedom
to act1 07 in international emergencies which would be unavailable
in wholly domestic matters.108
The Court, however, has refused to allow the Executive unlim-
ited emergency power. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer, 09 the Court demonstrated a readiness to insure that Presiden-
tial authority be exercised within parameters of constitutional
controls. 1 In perhaps the most widely cited opinion filed in
104 453 U.S. 280 (1980).
106 Id. at 292. The Court went on to cite Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952),
in which it states that matters relating "to the conduct of foreign relations ... are so exclu-
sively entrusted to the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judi-
cial inquiry or interference." Agee, 453 U.S. at 292 (citing Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 589);
accord Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).
10 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The issues in Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. arose from a Congres-
sional Joint Resolution which authorized the President to prohibit "the sale of arms and
munitions of war" to Bolivia or Paraquay if such prohibition would "'contribute to the rees-
tablishment of peace between those countries." Id. at 312. The trial court had sustained
Curtiss-Wright's demurrer to the charges of violating the concomitant Presidential procla-
mation, holding that the joint resolution was ineffective as a delegation of power to the
President by Congress. Id. at 314. The Supreme Court reversed, and in holding lawful the
delegation of power cited John Marshall while he was in the House of Representatives, 8
ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) stating, "[tihe President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., 299 U.S. at 319.
107 The main reasons given by the Court in finding a broad authority conceded to the
President in matters of foreign policy were the President's access to confidential sources of
information and secrecy. Id. at 320.
'08 The Court went further than a mere decision on the statutory questions presented,
finding among executive powers:
the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations - a power which
does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course,
like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the
applicable provisions of the Constitution.
Id. at 319-20.
109 343 U.S. 579 (1952). The importance of the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. decision
was underscored in that all six Justices in the majority authored separate opinions. See also
NOWAK, ROTUNDA, & YOUNG, supra note 60, at 214-16.
"0 Note, National Emergency Dilemma, supra note 31, at 1494.
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Youngstown, Justice Jackson established three separate categories
of Presidential authority in foreign policy matters.11" '
The first of Justice Jackson's scenarios concerns the action of a
President "pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Con-
gress." '112 This first category recognizes Presidential authority at its
fullest in that this subset of power "includes all that [power which
the President] possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can
delegate."" 3
The second category of powers arises when a President acts
without congressional approval or prohibition. 4 Justice Jackson
described how the powers found in this second category exist in a
"zone of twilight" where, even though the President may act in his
own right, Congress may have concurrent powers to act in the
same area." 5 This second category includes situations where the
distribution of authority between the two branches is unclear.' As
a result, in this category "the actual test of power is likely to de-
pend on the imperatives on events and contemporary imponder-
ables rather than on abstract theories of law.111 7
The third category of Presidential acts in Justice Jackson's
scheme are those in which the President acts contrary to the ex-
pressed will of Congress."" Actions taken against the will of Con-
gress are the most likely to be overturned by courts, because they
can only be supported if such actions are exclusively within the
powers of the President." 9
It appears that Justice Rehnquist may have been induced to
reach the labored conclusion, as he did, that the legislative history
of the grandfathered powers expressed an intention to delegate the
.1 Youngstown Sheet &. Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
112 Id. at 635.
"I Id. (footnote omitted). Presidential action taken according to the authority of this first
category would be afforded the highest presumption of legitimacy and would be declared
invalid only if the federal government as a whole lacked capacity to act. Id. at 636.
114 Id. at 637.
115 Id.
116 Id.
11 Id. (footnotes omitted).
... Id. The acts in this category are described as those backed by the weakest authority of
the President in as much as the Executive acts "upon his own constitutional powers minus
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter." Id.
Id. at 637-38. In recognizing that the Executive's powers were often not strictly de-
fined, Justice Jackson placed the primary onus of maintaining congressional power on Con-
gress itself. Id. at 654. ("We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the
hands of Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its
fingers.") Id.
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power to act in this matter of foreign policy to the President120 to
bring the action within the ambit of Justice Jackson's first cate-
gory. By including "all authorities conferred upon the President by
section 5(b) of the [TWEA]" '121 among those powers grandfathered
by the IEEPA, rather than construing only "restrictions" or
"prohibitions" as those powers extended by the acts, Justice Rehn-
quist raised the Reagan modification of the CACR to the status of
Justice Jackson's first category. The modification of the general li-
cense, since it could be brought under the statute, would therefore
be supported by the highest presumption of validity. 22
Such an interpretation stands in stark contrast with congres-
sional attempts to "revise" and "delimit" the power of the Presi-
dent in matters of foreign policy. 12 3 The opinion in Wald thus con-
firms the proposition that even though Congress may have
attempted to redefine the balance of power between the executive
and legislative branches in passing the IEEPA, "it did not substan-
tively change the [balance of] power by that redefinition. "124
IV. THE CONNECTION BETWEEN Dames & Moore And Wald
The reversal of congressional intent to limit Presidential author-
ity,1 5 as evidenced in Wald, 2 " underscores the primary preceden-
120 At least one commentator has suggested that Justice Rehnquist's opinions follow a
trend of judicial deference to the other branches of government in all areas. See Kleven,
The Constitutional Philosophy of Justice William H. Rehnquist, 8 VT. L. REV. 1, 21-22
(1983). Professor Kleven notes that "in only five of the sixty-two opinions [Rehnquist] wrote
through the 1981-1982 term did or would [he] override the acts of other branches of the
government." Id. at 22 n.62.
121 50 U.S.C. app. § 5 note (1982).
122 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637. Subsequently, once the regula-
tions were found to be authorized under a congressional grant of power, they could only be
declared invalid by a finding "that the Federal Government as a whole lacked the power
exercised by the President." Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674.
1' Contra Case Comment, Executive Branch Power: Presidential Powers in Foreign Re-
lations: Dames & Moore v. Regan, 95 HARv. L. REV. 191, 193 (1981) ("Indeed, the 'general
tenor of legislation such as the IEEPA and other foreign policy measures' indicat[es] Con-
gressional acceptance of a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as those
presented in [Dames & Moore].") Id. (footnote omitted).
12' Note, Presidential Emergency Powers, supra note 10, at 516 ("Both the history of the
President's unchallenged use of emergency economic power[s] for almost 45 years, and the
lack of strongly restrictive language inserted by Congress in [the IEEPA], indicate that this
p6wer is no longer delegated, but is permanently vested in the President.") Id. at 522; see
also Marks and Grabow, The President-Foreign Economic Powers After Dames & Moore
v. Regan: Legislation by Acquiescence, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 68, 101 (1982).
12' Note, Presidential Emergency Powers, supra note 10, at 515 ("The War Powers Reso-
lution and the National Emergencies Act were earlier pieces of legislation intended . . . to
retrieve congressional power which had been relinquished to the President.") Id.
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tial value of the case as a continuation of an attack on the IEEPA
which began in the case of Dames & Moore v. Regan and contin-
ued through Wald.'27
In Dames & Moore, the Supreme Court upheld President
Carter's ability to enter an agreement with Iran 2 ' nullifying judg-
ments and attachments against Iranian assets entered by American
courts.129 Issued by an unanimous Court, the decision in Dames &
Moore supports the broad use of executive power in foreign af-
fairs.130 Through its decision in Regan v. Wald, coupled with the
Dames & Moore opinion, the Supreme Court has established the
IEEPA as a broad grant of Presidential peacetime power, virtually
reversing the original intent of Congress in enacting the IEEPA.'3 '
Interestingly, the majority in Wald chose not to follow the lead
of Dames & Moore by dispensing with the matter in controversy
by mere statutory construction. 3 2 In Dames & Moore, the Court
ostensibly13 held that petitioner Dames & Moore, in operating
under the general license issued by the Carter administration,
never received any property interest in a judgment obtained
against the Iranian government.3 4 In support of such a statement,
the Court reasoned that the general license granted by the Carter
administration allowing subjects of the United States to proceed
against Iranian assets was "revocable," "contingent," and "in every
sense subordinate to the President's power under the IEEPA."' 5
' Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3034 n.16; Accord Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 672.
117 Compare Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3034, and Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 672 with Note,
Presidential Emergency Powers, supra note 10 at .522-23 and Note, National Emergency
Dilemma, supra note 31, at 1455-56.
's Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 690.
129 See generally Exec. Order No. 12,276, 3 C.F.R. 104-05 (1981) (Presidential documents
concerning Iran).
Although Justice Rehnquist repeatedly stated that the decision of the Court in Dames
& Moore would not dramatically shift the balance of power in matters of foreign policy
toward the executive branch, such a limited result has not occurred. See Note, The United
States-Iran Hostage Agreement: A Study in Presidential Powers, 15 CORNELL INT'L L. J.
149, 187 (1982); Note, Dames & Moore v. Regan: The Binding Effect of the Executive
Agreement Concluded During the International Dispute to Resolve the Hostage Crisis, 16
GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 401, 418 (1982) citing Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 660, 667
("These Acts [the IEEPA and the Hostage Act] further evidence Congress's [sicj approval
of broad Executive powers to deal with international crises.") Id.
1-1 See H.R. REP. No. 459, supra note 32, at 7; Hearings on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382,
supra note 13, at 83 (statement of Peter Weiss, Center for Constitutional Rights).
12 Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 674 n.6.
,.. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text.
12, Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 673.
122 Id. at 675 n.6.
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The reversal of congressional intent behind the IEEPA must,
therefore, have been international because the majority refused to
dispose of the case by construing the Carter general license as a
revocable right exercised subject to the continuing authority of the
President under the CACR. 1 3 Had the Court compared the regula-
tions involved in Dames & Moore and Wald, it could have dis-
posed of the case on limited grounds rather than by attacking the
IEEPA directly or addressing constitutional issues. By emphasiz-
ing the retention of the power to revoke the general license, the
Court could have found that President Carter retained executive
control over travel-related transactions through the July 1, 1977
termination date of non-grandfathered section 5(b) powers.
Although the Court did not treat the matter as dispositive, it did
explain that the President continued to regulate transactions
through the cut-off period of IEEPA137 by alternately allowing and
restricting travel. The Carter administration had eased travel re-
strictions for a period of time hoping to improve relations with
Cuba,138 and the Reagan administration restricted travel once
again when the Cuban government failed to respond favorably.1 39
In this way, the Court correctly noted that the President had, since
1963 and at all relevant time up to and through the termination of
non-grandfathered powers, maintained the power and authority to
regulate all transactions involving American subjects and Cuba or
Cuban nationals.' " The Court reasoned that the Carter general li-
cense was not a waiver of grandfathered powers inasmuch as regu-
lation 201(b) of the CACR was the ultimate source of authority on
American-Cuban transactions. Since regulation 201(b) had been in
continuous effect since 1963 "there were no separate 'travel restric-
"I Provisions included in 31 C.F.R. § 535.805 (1980) (Iranian Assets Control Regulations
involved in Dames & Moore) are identical to 31 C.F.R. § 515.805 (1982) (CACR involved in
Wald) ("The provisions of this part of any rulings, licenses, authorizations, instructions,
orders, or forms issued thereunder may be amended, modified, or revoked at any time.") Id.
"' Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3034. ("On July 1, 1977, the President was exercising his authority
over travel-related transactions with Cuba and Cubans by means of a general license which
exempted them from the categorical prohibition of Regulation 201(b).") Id.
"I The President's Remarks With Reporters at the Brunswick Airport Following the
First Lady's Departure, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 833 (May 30, 1977); The President's
Remarks in a Question and Answer Session with Reporters, 13 WEEKLY COMP. PaREs. Doc.
835 (May 31, 1977).
39 See Declaration of James H. Michel, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, 5, Regan v. Wald J.A., at 3 ("[T]he embargo has been used as a flexible
instrument oP foreign policy sensitive to the particular state of relations between the United
States and Cuba.") Id.
140 Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3034.
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tions,' either to be repealed in 1977 or reimposed in 1982. ' ' 4' The
Carter general license was, consequently, not an abdication of
grandfathered powers but merely a different form of transaction
controls. 42
V. THE MAINTENANCE OF DIPLOMATIC BARGAINING CHIPS
Since the Court refused to treat a Dames & Moore inspired in-
terpretation of the grandfather clause as dispositive, it was forced
to turn, intentionally or otherwise, to both the "bargaining chip"
rationale cited by the court of appeals as well as to constitutional
issues. Surprisingly, the Court chose to downplay the notion that
Congress grandfathered embargoes currently in place in order to
maintain the status quo in negotiations with respect to embargoed
countries. 14 3 This "bargaining chip" theory could have been used
as an effective tool in attacking the minority's position in Wald,
because it reveals an inherent weakness in the minority's position.
As stated, the minority's position that section 5(b) powers had
been waived by the Carter administration, if followed, would have
a negative impact in future negotiations with currently embargoed
countries 44 in two ways. First, under the minority's theory,"' the
United States would have no assurance that an embargoed country
would continue desired behavior if grandfathered section 5(b) pow-
ers were waived." Second, if easing restrictions on an embargoed
Id. at 3034 n.18.
142 Id. at 3035. The majority opinion attempted to explain this distinction by pointing out
that Wald was unable to visit Cuba only because transactions incident to general tourist
travel were not included in the license after the 1982 amendment to the regulations. Id.
"4 The notion of the "bargaining chip" was addressed repeatedly in congressional hear-
ings during the formative stages of the IEEPA and the amendments to the TWEA. Implicit
in the concept of the "bargaining chip" is that the various asset control regulations were
established to punish egregious behavior on the part of the subject state with relaxation of
restrictions held out to elicit desired behavior on the part of the affected nation. Congress
feared that the termination of § 5(b) powers would cause the elimination of restrictions
without achieving the desired behavior on the part of the subject state, thus resulting in the
abdication of a strong negotiating posture without a quid pro quo of behavior modification.
See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382, supra note 13, at 10 (statement of Professor
Andreas F. Lowenfeld); Id. at 103 (statement of Mr. Bergsten).
... Id. at 103 (statement of Mr. Bergsten); see also Note, Legal Impediments to Normali-
zation of Trade with Cuba, 8 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1007, 1053 (1976).
'" It follows from the argument put forth by the court below, Wald 708 F.2d at 796, and
by the minority, Wald 104 S.Ct. at 3044 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) that a President elimi-
nates restrictions by relaxing them.
"" One example where this contingency almost became a reality was the lifting of an
economic blockade against Rhodesia. 31 C.F.R. § 530.440 (1971). In 1971, the United States,
under the authority of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, 22 U.S.C. § 287a-e
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country would effectively eliminate such an option from a Presi-
dent's future consideration, he would be less likely to ease restric-
tions in the first place.14 Either of these two options would result
in an anomaly; intrasigence in negotiation on the part of the Presi-
dent, therefore, would be the most certain way of maintaining the
flexibility to act should the exigencies of future situations require.
Under the theory suggested by the minority, if diplomatic rela-
tions with a country once subjected to an embargo under
grandfathered section 5(b) powers, soured to any great extent after
the President eliminated the ability to reimpose sanctions, the
President could declare a new national emergency and reapply
sanctions under the procedures of the IEEPA.1'48 The declaration
of a new national emergency, however, is not a reasonable option
for a President involved in an embargo situation for several rea-
sons. First, the IEEPA tightened the scope of subjects constituting
an emergency. 49 By its operation, this new, more restrictive defini-
(1976), joined in a United Nations led embargo of Rhodesia. Moderation on the part of the
Rhodesian government led to a movement in Congress to lift sanctions against that country.
Recent Development, Economic Sanctions: The Lifting of Sanctions against Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia by the United States, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 253, 253-54 (1980). The movement
culminated with the Case-Javits Amendment to the International Securities Act of 1978,
International Security Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-384, 92 Stat. 730 (1978), which
authorized President Carter to lift sanctions against Rhodesia if the government demon-
strated its good faith by holding free and fair elections after a national conference where all
political parties in Rhodesia would be represented. H. CONF. REP. No. 1546, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., 29-30, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1868, 1876-77. On June 7, 1979,
however, just before lifting the sanctions, President Carter determined that the elections
had not been free or fair; nor was the Rhodesian government, in President Carter's view
"prepared to negotiate seriously about 'all relevant issues.' " 79 DEP'T ST. BULL. 25 (1979).
Sanctions against Rhodesia, therefore, were not lifted until December 15, 1979.
If a situation similar to the Rhodesian affair were to arise with regard to a country embar-
goed under the grandfathered powers of § 5(b) or the current IEEPA, the weakness of the
minority position would become manifest. For.example, if a President were to relax or dis-
miss grandfathered § 5(b) sanctions against an embargoed country because of concessions
made by that country favorable to United States policy interests, yet it was later deter-
mined that the concession was not being continued, according to the view of the minority in
Wald, such sanctions would have been eliminated from the authority of the President and
could not be reimposed without a new declaration of national emergency.
1,7 Note, National Emergency Dilemma, supra note 31, at 1461.
-48 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701(b), 1703 (1982). The option of requiring a President to declare a new
national emergency was debated and rejected in congressional hearings on the proposed
IEEPA and amendments to the TWEA. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382,
supra note 13, at 155-75, 190.
1'9 Hearings on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382, supra note 13, at 11. The addition by the
IEEPA of a definition of "national emergency" was intended to correct the supposed flaw
created by the President having the undefined and unilateral power to declare a national
emergency. Note, National Emergency Dilemma, supra note 31, at 1455; The National
Emergencies Act: Hearings on H.R. 3884 before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and
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tion would lessen the instance of national emergency declarations
because fewer international situations would include the necessary
criteria. Coexistent with this restrictive definition of national
emergency is a skepticism on the part of some members of Con-
gress as to whether a national emergency exists in all but the most
dire circumstances.150
Second, the counterproductive effect that the declaration of a
new national emergency would have on any delicate negotiating
process precludes such a declaration. 5' If a President could not
declare a new national emergency because of concern that such a
declaration would offend the other country in a negotiating pro-
cess, he would be precluded from using the full range of sanctions
that should be at his disposal, without a reciprocal gesture by the
other country. This scenario is exactly what the Congress and the
minority in Wald sought to avoid by stating that the reason for
grandfathering section 5(b) powers was to maintain "bargaining
chips" when terminating outstanding states of national emer-
gency.15
2
The failure of a new declaration of national emergency as an ef-
fective option in handling difficult international matters eliminates
an easy solution to balancing conflicting interests of Congress and
the President within the constitutional framework of American
government in matters of foreign policy. What remains is the diffi-
cult issue, which the Court attempted to answer in Wald, of which
branch of government will predominate in foreign affairs. The
Court opted to continue a tradition of Presidential preeminence in
foreign policy by blocking attempts by Congress to reverse "[the]
trend toward greater Presidential initiative . . . which until re-
cently [the Congress] had supported."' 3
Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91
(1975).
"' Hearings on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382, supra note 13, at 110 (colloquy between Rep.
Bingham and Assistant Secretary of State Julius L. Katz). But cf. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 14.
The Wald Court rejected such a limited use of a declaration of national emergency. 104
S.Ct. at 3039.
15 See Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3037, 3043 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It would have been
incongruous, in other words, for Congress to force the President to declare new emergencies
in nonemergency situations simply to avoid having to end restrictions that, for negotiating
reasons, the President had concluded should not be ended unilaterally.") Id. at 3043; see
also Hearings on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382, supra note 13, at 19 (statement of Prof.
Lowenfeld); id. at 191-92 (statement of Mr. Santos, Counsel Treasury Department); id. at 24
(statement of Prof. Harold G. Maier).
See supra notes 143-54 and accompanying text.
Note, Presidential Emergency Powers, supra note 10, at 515.
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VI. JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S ATTACK ON THE IEEPA AND TWEA
In two Rehnquist opinions, Dames & Moore v. Regan and Regan
v. Wald, the Court thwarted the movement in Congress as re-
flected in the IEEPA to limit the "almost dictatorial powers"'' of
the President in matters of foreign policy. In both cases, the Court
deferred to the judgment of the Executive, thereby constraining
congressional power in matters of foreign policy.'5 5 As such, the
Court in these two cases mirrors the prevalent view that the Exec-
utive is the branch of the American government singularly adapted
to predominate in matters of foreign policy.'15
In addition, since any requirement that a President should "seek
specific authority from Congress to act in an emergency would be
dangerous,"'157 the decision by the Supreme Court in Regan v.
Wald should be recognized for its maintenance, in this one specific
example, of the flexibility requisite for effective response by the
President in emergency situations. The Court was able to achieve
this flexibility by bringing the economic sanctions required by the
Cuba-United States international situation under the authority of
the grandfather clause of the amended TWEA and IEEPA. Should
a similar situation arise with an embargoed country not under the
provisions of the grandfather clause of the NEA, IEEPA, and
TWEA, however, the President would be unable to reapply sanc-
tions under the IEEPA unless he was willing to declare a new na-
tional emergency. Inasmuch as the declaration of a new national
emergency is an unworkable solution, the failings of such a posi-
tion emphasize the necessity of amending the IEEPA to provide
for the reapplication of economic sanctions should the need arise
during the course of a national emergency without the need to de-
clare a new national emergency.'58
," Note, National Emergency Dilemma, supra note 31, at 1453.
, See Marks and Grabow, supra note 124, at 101.
See Note, Congressional Attempts to Control, supra note 99, at 1112.
17 Id.
1' Throughout the hearings on the proposed IEEPA and the amended TWEA, it was
naturally assumed that all circumstances prompting declarations of national emergencies
would follow a scenario whereby an initial tense period of maximum sanctions would gradu-
ally be followed by a consistent reduction of tension between the United States and the
embargoed country. Hence, there was no provision made for a situation such as the Rhode-
sian affair where relations between the United States and an embargoed country would sour
after a period of reduced tension. Congress, therefore, should amend the IEEPA to allow a
President to re-apply sanctions to meet such a scenario in as much as the option of declar-
ing a new national emergency would be counterproductive.
The ability of a President to re-apply sanctions in the situation that Wald presented was
[Vol. 15:83
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Regan v. Wald stands as
the latest important installment in what has become a perpetual
state of tension between the power and authority of the Congress
and the President in foreign policy matters. ' 59 Yet, its importance
in the area of allocation of foreign policy powers notwithstanding,
Wald stands as a decision that will have only limited impact on
the totality of current global applications of transaction and travel
restrictions. 6 ° Of important precedential value, however, is the
Court's implicit categorization of the Reagan administration's re-
application of travel and transaction restrictions as an exercise of
power specifically authorized by Congress.".' The Wald Court ap-
peared willing to sacrifice attempted legislative constraints on the
executive branch in matters of foreign policy,"6 2 in favor of the
traditional deference afforded by the courts to the President in
such matters.613
The decision in Wald, considered together with Justice Rehn-
quist's earlier opinion in Dames & Moore v. Regan, also acts as a
specific reversal of the congressional momentum behind the
IEEPA and the amended TWEA.6 " Wald restructures both the
IEEPA and the amended TWEA as broad grants of authority from
the Congress to the President in matters of foreign policy, instead
of the restrictive devices their authors intended. 6 5
The Wald decision, further, makes an important statement on
the current status of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
travel. The Court continued a move from a policy where such free-
dom may only be restricted by the "weightiest concerns of foreign
established by a broad reading of the langauge which grandfathered powers under the NEA,
IEEPA, and TWEA. The IEEPA, however, contains no such language with regard to emer-
gencies which might occur in the future. Subsequently, the balance struck between the Pres-
ident and Congress by the Wald Court by resorting to broad construction of the word "au-
thorities" would be precluded in future Presidential emergency power issues.
'0 See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 662.
160 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
161 Under Justice Jackson's scheme in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 636 (1952), actions taken by the President and specifically authorized by Congress are
entitled to the strongest presumptions of validity.
"6' Case Comment, Presidential Powers-the Iranian Hostage Claims and Settlement
Act-A Valid Exercise of Presidential Powers, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S.Ct. 2972
(1981), 6 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 209, 215 (1982).
163 Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3038-39.
16, Accord Marks and Grabow, supra note 124, at 101.
' Hearings on H.R. 1560 and H.R. 2382, supra note 13, at 114.
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policy" to a policy of acquiescence to the political branches of gov-
ernment. 66 Whether Congress will passively allow itself to be
placed in an inferior position in the continuing struggle over for-
eign policy powers, or whether it will respond to the challenge is-
sued by Justice Rehnquist 1 7 and make its intentions in the area of
Presidential emergency powers perfectly clear, therefore, remains
to be seen.
Thomas Matthew Mashburn
"' See supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
167 Wald, 104 S.Ct. at 3035.
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